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"Constitutional Tenure:" Toward
a Realization of Academic Freedom
Harry W. Pettigrew
I. INTRODUCTION
A LOOK at the philosophical basis for academic tenure reveals
an attempt to advance academic freedom through the protec-
tion of capable educators.' As succinctly stated by an Arizona. court:
[T~he broad purpose of teacher tenure is to protect worthy in-
structors from enforced yielding to political preferences and to
guarantee to such teachers employment after a long period of satis-
factory service regardless of the vicissitudes of politics or the likes
or dislikes of those charged with the administration of school af-
fairs.2
This philosophy, however, has
become lost in a morass of prag-THE AUTHOR: HARRY W. PE-rIGEEW matic attitudes.3  Rather than
(B.S., University of Toledo; J.D., Ohio
State University) is an Assistant Pro- serving solely to achieve the
fessor of Business Law at Ohio Univer- greater end of academic free-
sity and a member of the Ohio Bar. dom, the concept of tenure has
become a vehicle by which di-
verse interest groups may further their individual aims: To the novice
1 For the evolution of the concept of academic freedom as the basis for academic
tenure, see R. HAFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1969).
In 1940, representatives of the Association of American Colleges and the American
Association of University Professors formulated the following definition of academic free-
dom:
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publica-
tion of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic
duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understand-
ing with the authorities of the institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his
subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial
matter which has no relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom
because of religious or other aims of the institution should be dearly stated
in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned
profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or
writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline,
but his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a
man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public
may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he
should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should
show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indi-
cate that he is not an institutional spokesman. Academic Freedom and Ten-
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teacher who has just been baptized by the waters of the meandering
stream of standards for professorial success, the bestowing of tenure
may serve as a means to gain recognition of tutorial excellence from
his peers. To the academic administrator, tenure may serve as a carrot
to extract from the nontenured faculty member further performance
toward the nebulous perimeter of pedagogical accomplishment. 4 To
a state legislator, the tenure system of state-supported institutions
may serve as a political issue which he uses to exhort his wage-earn-
ing constituents into believing that this sanctuary for incompetents,
social misfits, and subversives must be statutorily expunged from the
educational system.5
Furthermore, even when viewed as a means by which to achieve
academic freedom, the scope of academic tenure is severely delimited.
Since academic freedom does not rest on a theory of special privilege
or individual right (but rather on the hope for social progress through
the unfettered spirit of inquiry), only those who have been granted
tenure will carry the shield enabling them to better exercise academic
freedom. The nontenured faculty member who choses to exercise
such freedom remains virtually unprotected. Having invoked the
displeasure of the university administrator, he may find his relations
with the institution seriously impaired or his employment contract
not renewed. In short, academic tenure is no more than an artificial
line of demarcation which, until reached, leaves the novice faculty
member insecure in his exercise of academic freedom.
A survey of recent case law, however, reveals that the problem
has not gone unrecognized. With an increasing willingness of the
courts to apply certain constitutional protections - hereinafter re-
ferred to as "constitutional tenure" - the nontenured staff member
need no longer refrain from exercising academic freedom. Non-
tenured faculty dismissals or nonretentions that in the past would
are: Basic Statements, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 33, 35-36 (L.
Joughin ed. 1969).
2 School Dist. v. Superior Court, 102 Ariz. 478, 480, 433 P.2d 28, 30 (1967).
3 See generally R. HAFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 1.
4 Tenure is essentially the application of civil service to the teaching profession.
See McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 202 Minn. 102, 277 N.W. 541 (1938).
5 The plenary power of state legislatures over education applies also to teacher tenure
unless limited by constitutional provisions. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 31 Cal. App. 2d
734, 89 P.2d 148 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939). Even where constitutional provisions seem-
ingly control teacher employment, courts have construed tenure statutes so as not to
be in conflict with those constitutional provisions. See, e.g., State ex rel. Glover v.
Holbrook, 129 Fla. 241, 176 So. 99 (1937); McQuaid v. State ex rel. Sigler, 211 Ind.
595, 6 N.E.2d 547 (1937); State ex rel. Bishop v. Board of Educ., 139 Ohio St. 427, 40
N.E.2d 913 (1942); Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, 197 A. 344 (1938).
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have been upheld as consistent with the tenure system might be
found to be unconstitutional today. The concept of "constitutional
tenure" and the protection it affords the nontenured teacher will be
discussed below; however, before doing so, brief consideration will
be given to tenure systems in general.
II. TENURE SYSTEMS
Generally speaking, formal tenure systems are employment se-
curity devices. Upon an academic administrator's determination that
a particular teacher has sufficiently developed himself during a pre-
scribed probationary period, the reward of tenure may be granted.
Once tenured, the faculty member's continuation of satisfactory ser-
vice limits and qualifies the power which the governing body of
the institution would ordinarily possess to terminate employment.'
Only upon satisfaction of certain procedural safeguards 7 and a show-
in of good cause will a tenured teacher suffer dismissal.8 The
prescribed requirements for attaining tenure and the protections af-
forded thereby may be derived from either statute or contract.
A. Statutory Tenure
The vast majority of states have tenure statutes.' The provisions,
however, may vary from state to state in accordance with the parti-
6 Such a system of protection has negative as well as the obvious positive aspects.
To the young, aggressive teacher, tenure is often a secondary substitute for promotion
and salary. For the administration, such bureaucratic security may attract teachers who
are seeking permanent employment with minimum performance demands. In addition,
the administration, at the risk of invoking publicity, expense, and the hostility of pro-
fessional teachers' groups, may be reluctant to effect the procedures required under the
tenure system to dismiss a tenured teacher. Furthermore, in the relatively short period
allowed for the detision of whether to grant tenure, the teacher has only recently ad-
justed to his position and the administration has not yet been able to evaluate his now
stabilizing performance. Nevertheless, "[w]hatever its shortcomings, it is generally
agreed that tenure does achieve two desirable objectives: it protects good teachers from
unjust dismissal and it provides an orderly procedure to be followed in the dismissal
of incompetent members of a professional staff. These are objectives of major dimen-
sions in the administration of staff personnel." L. PETERSON, R. ROSSMILLER & M.
VoLz, THE LAw AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 530 (1969). Moreover, the main
purpose of a tenure system - to help create and maintain an atmosphere conducive to
the development of academic freedom - is generally viewed as outweighing its disad-
vantages. See Byse & Merry, Tenure and Academic Freedom, in CHALLENGE AND
CHANGE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 313-28 (S. Harris ed. 1965); Machlup, In Defense
of Academic Tenure, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENUIRE 306, 312-28 (L. Joughin
ed. 1969).
7 See notes 18-26 infra & accompanying text.
8 See text accompanying notes 12-17 infra.
9 See NATIONAL EDUCATION ASS'N OF THE UNITED STATES, RESEARCH Div.,
TENURE AND CoNTRAcTs 33-38 (1969).
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cular type and level of institution at which a person teaches., Pri-
marily, the tenure statutes are applicable to teachers at the public
elementary and high school levels." The public university teacher
is usually not covered, or if he is, he is treated under separate stat-
utory provisions. The educators of private insititutions never fall
under the protective umbrella of tenure statutes.
Under the state tenure statutes a teacher may be required to com-
plete a probationary period of anywhere from 2 to 5 years. If after
that time the school wishes to continue the teacher's employment, he
will be given a contract, nonterminable until retirement. Unless the
faculty must be reduced or good cause is shown, the faculty mem-
ber will retain his position.12
Where termination of an employment contract is sought on the
basis of good cause, the reasons most commonly given are "incom-
petency,"' 3 "immorality,"14 "insubordination,"' 5 "physical or mental
unfitness,"' 6 and "neglect of duty."'1 7  These substantive standards,
although somewhat broad and vague, provide a form of protection
from arbitrary dismissal by defining legal standards which are sub-
ject to judicial review. In addition, to insure that the judicial review
is more than a posthumous inquest, the typical statute allows for
procedural safeguards in the form of (1) written notice of the in-
tended sanction,' 8 (2) a formal written statement of the charges, 9
and (3) a right to request an open or closed hearing before the board
10 "The general rule is that only those positions enumerated in the tenure statute are
encompassed by its provisions. Thus locally-created positions with titles not set out in
the statute are not covered. Which positions are to be covered is within the preroga-
tive of the legislature." E. REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION 448 (1970).
11 See generally NATIONAL EDUCATION ASS'N OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
9.
1' See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.150 (1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1212
(1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4307 (1948); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5403,-5406,-5410
(Supp. 1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3319.08-.081 (Page Supp. 1970).
13 See, e.g., Horosko v. School Dist., 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 308
U.s. 553 (1939).
14 See, e.g., Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist., 12 Ohio Misc. 288,
233 N.E.2d 143 (Lake County C.P. 1967).
15 See, e.g., Johnson v. United School Dist., 201 Pa. Super. 375, 191 A.2d 897
(1963).
16 See, e.g., Appeal of School Dist., 347 Pa. 418, 32 A.2d 565, cert. denied, 320 U.S.
782 (1943).
17 See, e.g., Hamberlin v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 210 La. 483, 27 So. 2d 307
(1946).
18 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:443 (West 1963).
19 See, e.g., State ex Tel. Charbonnet v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 188 So. 2d 143
(La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 249 La. 727, 190 So. 2d 238 (1966).
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of education." Where the teacher requests a hearing, he should
have a right to legal counsel,.- to present2 2 and subpoena evidence
and witnesses, and to confront and cross-examine opposing wit-
nesses.24 The board has the burden of proof in establishing the
cause for the teacher's discharge.25 A full stenographic record
should be made and a written decision - which may include find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law - should be provided. 6 Tenure
statutes have been construed liberally to effect the general purpose
of the legislation: that is, the courts have given major emphasis to
promoting the fundamental public policy of obtaining better educa-
tion for the children of the state.
Although the teacher is generally required to exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies,28 the aforementioned statutory requirements af-
ford him a means by which he may seek review in the state courts.
Such judicial review is founded upon complete development and a
full record of the facts presented at the hearing. The remedies most
commonly sought are reinstatement and damages for breach of con-
tract.2" The most common issue presented is misapplication of the
"good cause" standard. If the school administration was not remiss
in following prescribed statutory procedures, the reviewing court
20 See Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1086 (1968).
21 See id.
22 See, e.g., Rehberg v. Board of Educ., 345 Mich. 731, 77 N.W.2d 131 (1956).
23See Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, supra note 20, at 1086.
24 Additional evidence is not to be presented at an executive session following the
adjournment of the hearing. Moffett v. Calcasieu Parish School Bd., 179 So. 2d 537
(La. Ct. App. 1965).
2 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13412 (West 1969), which requires that upon a
teacher's demand for a hearing, the school board must either rescind its action or file a
complaint in a superior court setting forth the charges against the employee and allow-
ing the court to determine if the charges are true and if they constitute sufficient grounds
for dismissal.
2 6 See, e.g., Morey v. School Bd., 268 Minn. 110, 128 N.W.2d 302 (1964), rehear-
ing denied, 271 Minn. 445, 136 N.W.2d 105 (1965); cf. Agner v. Smith, 167 So.
2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), appeal dismissed mem., 172 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1965).
2 7 E.g., Swick v. School Dist, 141 Pa. Super. 246, 251, 14 A.2d 898, 900 (1940).
But see Anderson v. Board of Educ., 390 I. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562 (1945), and Eveland
v. Board of Educ., 340 Ill. App. 308, 92 N.E.2d 182 (1950) (tenure statutes con-
strued strictly in favor of boards of education on the grounds that such statutes create a
new liability on the part of boards, and that the statutes are in derogation of certain
common law rights of the school boards); Andrews v. Union Parish School Bd., 191
La. 90, 184 So. 552 (1938) (tenure statute construed liberally in favor of teachers as
the primary beneficiaries of such legislation).
2 8 See, e.g., Moore v. Starkey, 185 Kan. 26, 340 P.2d 905 (1959).
2 0 In addition, school boards and individual members may be held personally liable
under the tenure laws when they wrongfully exercise ministerial functions. Babb v.
Moore, 374 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
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will uphold the administrative decision as long as it was based on
"substantial evidence" 30 or was not "arbitrary and capricious,"'"
Tenure statutes generally afford little if any protection to the
nontenured teacher. Since the authority to grant tenure falls within
the broad discretion of the school board, a refusal to grant tenure
is ordinarily not reviewable by the courts.32  In addition, the non-
tenured teacher generally has no right to notice of cause or a hear-
ing for renewal, unless, as in some states, they are specifically pro-
vided for by statute.3 3
B. Contractual Tenure
Contractual tenure becomes most important in private and higher
education since these areas are generally devoid of statutory protec-
tion.34  The private institutions and public universities, therefore,
30 See Last v. Board of Educ., 37 111. App. 2d 159, 185 N.E.2d 282 (1962); Haus-
wald v. Board of Educ., 20 IlI. App. 2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1958); Swisher v. Darden,
59 N.M. 511, 287 P.2d 73 (1955).
31See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 6 N.Y.2d 127, 160 N.E.2d 60, 188 N.Y.S.2d 515
(1959). A trial de novo before the court is normally not permitted. Parker v. Board
of Trustees, 242 Cal. App. 2d 614, 51 Cal. Rptr. 653 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
32 Cf. Application of Lombardo, 18 App. Div. 2d 444, 240 N.Y.S.2d 119, ajjfd
mem., 13 N.Y.2d 1097, 196 N.E.2d 266, 246 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1963). But see Albaurn
v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), where a high school teacher alleged that
he was denied tenure status for his union activities and that the state tenure laws gave
unconstitutionally broad discretion to school administrators. The district court recognized
that "[t]enure decisions present delicate and difficult questions in any educational sys-
tem." Id. at 11. The court further stated that "[i]t may be that precise standards cannot
be formulated for determining who shall be appointed to tenure.... [But as] one com-
mentator has put it... 'the impossibility of defining with precision the scope of the em-
ployer's appropriate control over the employee is insufficient reason for treating that
control as boundless."' Id. at 12, quoting Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1404, 1407 (1967). In addition, an attempted denial of tenure is ineffective where it
is coupled with the hiring of the previously probationary teacher for I more year.
See, e.g., La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6, 276 P. 377 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929). And a
teacher may be found to have gained tenure by estoppel. Eulalie M. Sanders, 72 N.Y.
Dep't R. 39 (Educ. Dep't 1951).
A few tenure statutes do, however, set forth minimal requirements for the dismissal
of nontenured personnel. If nontetention after the probationary period does not comply
with these requirements, the court may order the administration to grant professional
tenure to the discharged employee. See Elias v. Board of School Directors, 421 Pa.
260, 218 A.2d 738 (1966), where the court ordered that permanent professional status
be granted to two school nurses who were certified and had served the appropriate pro-
bationary period. The tenure statute provided that temporary professional employees
had to be rated twice a year and could not be dismissed unless rated "unsatisfactory."
Neither of the nurses had ever been so rated. See also Mannix v. Board of Educ., 21
N.Y.2d 455, 235 N.E.2d 892, 288 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1968).
33 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.140 (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1304(b)
(Supp. 1969); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-151 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-8-9 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-13-2 (Supp. 1970).
34 "The prime need is not for extramural intervention, but for each institution of
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will often embody in their by-laws or regulations rights similar to
those found in the tenure statutes. These rights are in turn in-
corporated by reference into the teacher's contract of employmentf 5
Should the administration not honor the provisions, the contractually
tenured teacher often has the leverage of influential, teacher pres-
sure groups which may adopt sanctions against the university for
noncompliance36 Along with the usual remedies available for breach
of contract, there is authority for reinstatement via a prerogative
writ.37
C. Absence of Tenure
Where there is no tenure system38 or where the system lacks
either substantive or procedural safeguards, the teacher is relegated
to the state law respecting employment contracts. Assuming that the
employment contract does not contain provisions analogous to the
tenure statutes, the teacher has no right to renewal at the end of the
contract period.39 Under such circumstances, the employer, in the per-
son of the board of education or the board of trustees, has vast dis-
cretion as to the teacher's contract renewal. The board also has the
ability to discharge the teacher during the term of the contract. Al-
higher learning to engage in systematic discussion and analysis and to take appropriate
action to make tenure as positive a force as possible for the good of education." Byse &
Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education: "Specific Conclusions and Recommen-
dations", in AcADEMIc FREEDOM AND TENURE 210 (L. Joughin ed. 1969).
85 See State ex tel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939).
36 For an analysis of the various contemporary pressures supporting academic free-
dom, see S. HOOK, AcAn~ic FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC ANARCHY (1969); DeBar-
deleben, The University's External Constituency, in DMNSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOm 69 (1969). See also AMERICAN CIIL IBERTIES UNION, AcADEmic FREEDOM,
ACADEMIC DUE PROCESS (1966); Joughin, Academic Due Process, in AcADmIC FREE-
DOM AND TENURE 264 (L Joughin ed. 1969).
37 See State ex tel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939) (manda-
mus action against state university officials); State ex tel. Richardson v. Board of Re-
gents, 70 Nev. 144, 261 P.2d 515 (1953) (writ of certiorari issued to review actions
of state university officials on theory that their action was quasi-judicial in nature). But
see Davis, Enforcing Academic Tenure: Reflections and Suggestions, 1961 WIS. L.
REV. 200, 216-18.
Where tenure regulations are promulgated by a university or a board of regents,
a number of courts have refused to bind the board to contractual tenure because of the
derogation of the board's statutory power to dismiss arbitrarily and without cause.
See Posin v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957); Worzella v. Board
of Regents of Educ., 77 S.D. 447, 93 N.W.2d 411 (1958); State ex tel. Hunsicker v.
Board of Regents, 209 Wis. 83, 244 N.W. 618 (1932).
38 Although a majority of the states have tenure statutes, a significant number do
not. See NATIONAL EDUCATION Ass'N OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 9.
30 Cf. Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), afd per curiam, 348
F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966) (arbitrary nonrenewal
of probationary teacher's contract was upheld).
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though such a dismissal may entitle the teacher to damages for
breach of contract, the employer will escape liability upon a show-
ing of cause.4° Moreover - assuming that the common law doctrine
of sovereign immunity is not already a bar to the suit under the
particular state's law4 - such a damage action by the aggrieved
teacher is often unsatisfactory. If he prevails, he no longer has a po-
sition;42 if he seeks and procures another position, the principle of
mitigation of damages will substantially reduce the amount of his
recovery.43 Should the teacher choose injunctive relief instead, he
will find that such a remedy is not generally available for breach of
an employment contract."4  The prerogative writ, where the em-
ployer is a public institution, would also fail since the continued
employment of the nontenured teacher is generally not a mandatory
duty of a public official.45
In summary, where tenure systems exist, the protections afforded
by statute or contract allow for the exercise of academic freedom by
those who have been granted tenure. The teacher who has not been
granted statutory or contractual tenure, as well as the teacher where
4 0 See Millar v. Joint School Dist., 2 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 86 N.W.2d 455, 460
(1957) (dictum).
41 The threshold problem in a suit brought under state substantive law is that in
many states the doctrine of sovereign immunity disallows suits brought against the state,
except in such courts and in such manner as may be provided by statute. And suits
against state institutions and officials where the state is the real party in interest are of
course considered suits against the state. See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Glander,
148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947).
At least 9 states have consented by statute to suit on their contracts: ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 258, § 1
(1956); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6419 (1962); MoNT. REV. CODE ANN. § 83.601
(1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-324 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491.8 (1955);
N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 9 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12-03 (1960); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.92.010 (Supp. 1970).
Such statutes, however, are narrowly construed. For example, in Wolf v. Ohio
State Univ. Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959), a tort action against a state-
supported hospital, the court refused to find that the state had consented to suit, even
though OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3335.03 (Page 1953) provided that the Board of
Trustees of the Ohio State University could "sue and be sued." The court reasoned that
since this section did not designate in what courts and in what manner suit could be
brought against the Board, it was not the intention of the legislature to consent to suits
against the Board.
42 Cf. Independent Dist. v. Deibert, 60 S.D. 424, 244 N.W. 656 (1932).
43 See, e.g., Miller v. South Bend Special School Dist., 124 N.W.2d 475 (N.D.
1963); Coble v. School Dist., 178 Pa. Super. 301, 116 A.2d 113 (1955).
44 See, e.g., Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Felch v. Findlay
College, 119 Ohio App. 357, 200 N.E.2d 353 (Hancock County Ct. App. 1963).
45 See, e.g., Posin v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957); State
ex rel. Hunsicker v. Board of Regents, 209 Wis. 83, 244 N.W. 618 (1932).
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there is no tenure system or where that system is inadequate, must
rely on the limited protection afforded by a particular state's law re-
specting employment contracts. With such limited protection, these
nontenured teachers are able to exercise academic freedom only at
the risk of nonrenewal of their contracts or dismissal for unpre-
scribed cause. In view of these risks accompanying the nontenured
teacher's exercise of academic freedom, the concept of constitutional
tenure becomes relevant. Constitutional tenure, however, is not
significant for the nontenured teacher alone; it may be equally sig-
nificant for the tenured teacher whose dismissal for cause hinges
upon constitutional freedoms. Thus, although the following discus-
sion will be directed primarily toward the constitutional protections
afforded the nontenured teacher, it must be kept in mind that the ap-
plicability of constitutional tenure is not so limited.
III. THE TREND
As James Madison once stated: "If men were angels, no govern-
ment would be necessary." 48  It may be added that if those who
govern were even demiangels no due process requirements would be
necessary. It has long been recognized, however, that arbitrariness,
even deliberate arbitrariness, "is not unknown in the most elite intel-
lectual circles," 4 and university administrators are not necessarily
among those best known as paragons of fair play. Nevertheless, un-
til recently, in court actions brought by teachers confronted with dis-
missal or nonretention, the alleged arbitrary and capricious acts of
the administration were generally vindicated. The courts, honoring
the doctrine of judicial restraint, gave great deference to the admin-
istrator's expertise in evaluating the myriad of variables and inter-
personal relationships necessary to maintain the academic homeostasis
within the educational institution. But the increasingly evident im-
personal bureaucracy and errant decisions of educational administra-
tors has led the courts to more readily enter the academic environs.
Whereas previously the protections afforded by the due process
clause of the 14th amendment were not deemed applicable to teach-
ers against whom the school administration had applied arbitrary
sanctions,48 today, such teachers are beginning to receive substantial
4 6 T-m FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 (Nat'l Home Library Found. ed. 1938) (A. Ham-
ilton, J. Jay & J. Madison).
4 7 Byse, The University and Due Procesr. A Somewhat Different View, 54 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 143 (1968).
4 8 See, e.g., Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111-12, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927)
(the "monkey trial"), where the court stated:
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constitutional protection. No longer need the teacher rely solely
upon the conceptualisms that inhere in the state's contract or ten-
ure laws. The hypostasis of the past that public employment is a
privilege to which the state may attach conditions restricting the
employee's positive constitutional freedoms - subject only to the
ill-defined limitations that the conditions be reasonable49 - has been
explicitly discredited by the Supreme Court.50 In doing so, the
Court presaged a trend in the lower courts which have recognized
a general due process right against arbitrary, capricious, and unrea-
sonable action by tax-supported institutions against their teachers.5
To the university administrator, the spectre of federal court de-
cisions challenging areas that were once considered the educational
world's peculiar province may well be viewed with alarm. The ad-
ministrator has probably just revamped, at a considerable expense in
time and money, the student disciplinary system to accommodate
burgeoning procedural and substantive due process requirements.
Is he now faced with a similar burden respecting his faculty em-
ployment policies? Is this previously sacrosanct area of "academic
process" also being overlaid with an insensitive gloss of "judicial
process" which has such a degree of complexity that it leaves the ad-
ministrator constantly vulnerable to the summons server? Has the
clear legislative intent of the tenure statutes been controverted by a
nontenured faculty member's absolute right to employment at a
public institution - this right supposedly being derived from the
United States Constitution? Although the answer to these questions
is a qualified no, the administrator might well anticipate changes in
policy which will necessarily accompany the new constitutional pro-
tections afforded the nontenured teacher. "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the
The plaintiff in error was a teacher in the public schools of Rhea county.
He was an employee of the state of Tennessee or of a municipal agency of the
state. He was under contract with the state to work in an institution of the
state. He had no right or privilege to serve the state except upon such terms
as the state prescribed ....
The statute before us .. . . is an act of the state as a corporation, a pro-
prietor, an employer. It is a declaration of a master as to the character of
work the master's servant shall, or rather shall not, perform. In dealing with
its own employees engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by
the limitations of . .. the Tennessee Constitution, nor of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
40 See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
50 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). See also Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
51 See, e.g., Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D.
Wis. 1970); Gouge v. Joint School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education [and
Boards of Trustees) not excepted. These have, of course, important,
delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." 2 To this end,
"riut can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate." 3  Although the courts have often stated the principle
that teachers deserve special protection because of society's interest
in the preservation of academic freedom,54 the protection that is
promised them under the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" 55
- and promised, as a general matter, to all public employees56 -
is just beginning to be realized.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL TENURE
A. Threshold Problems
Before the substantive and procedural due process contours of
constitutional tenure are considered, it is necessary to discuss the
questions of jurisdiction and sovereign immunity as they pertain to
constitutional tenure.
1. Jurisdiction.- A teacher alleging a deprivation of his con-
stitutional rights can assert a federal cause of action under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.5' Federal district courts have
52 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
53 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
54 "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned." Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). "The vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
55 "Generally the doctrine states that while a government, state or federal, may not
be obligated to provide its citizens with a certain benefit or privilege, it may not grant
the benefit or privilege on conditions requiring the recipient in some manner to re-
linquish his constitutional rights." Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, 117 U. PA. L REv. 144 (1968). See also Note, supra note 50.
5 6See Comment, supra note 55.
57 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
A somewhat similar federal remedy exists under section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964), which provides a federal cause of action for
the deprivation of equal protection of the law or equal privileges and immunities under
the law. Actions under section 1985(3), however, are restricted to instances where the
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original jurisdiction to hear such a complaint,58 and because the rem-
edy available under section 1983 has been declared supplementary
to any state remedies, the complainant need not seek redress in the
state courts before the federal remedy may be invoked.59 To sus-
tain an action under section 1983,60 the complainant must dearly
show (1) that the defendant's (university's) conduct deprived the
complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
United States Constitution and laws,"' and (2) that the conduct
complained of was engaged in under color of state law.61
In view of the latter requirement as it is construed under the
doctrine of state action, section 1983 becomes especially significant to
the nontenured teacher in the state-supported institution. As early
as 1947 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the
dismissal of a nontenured teacher from a state-supported institution
under a statute providing for dismissal of a probationary teacher
for any reason or no reason was " 'under color' of a state statute,"
and, therefore, the court had jurisdiction. 63  It is not always neces-
sary that such a state statute exist; indeed, state action is generally
found whenever the conduct of a state agency infringes upon a per-
son's rights." Whether jurisdiction is granted to a teacher in a
state-supported university will thus depend, for the most part, upon
the finding of a constitutionally protected interest.6"
defendant's conduct infringes upon the rights of several persons or a class of persons.
See Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (a white doctor discharged with-
out a hearing as a result of allegations that he was biased against Negroes stated a valid
claim under section 1983 and not under section 1985 (3)).
5828 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) (granting original jurisdiction to federal district
courts to hear, among others, actions asserting a deprivation of constitutional rights,
privileges, or immunities under color of state law).
59 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112,
117 (D. Mass. 1969).
60 Cf. Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1043 (1968); Colon v. Grieco, 226 F. Supp. 414 (D.N.J. 1964).
11 Cf. Flemming v. Adams, 377 F.2d 975 (10th Cir.), cet. denied, 389 U.S. 898
(1967); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
6 2 See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1968).
63 Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
64 The Supreme Court has pointed out that in a section 1983 action, "under color
of law" refers to an action taken by an agent of the state whose power is derived from
state law and that the action itself need not be "pursuant" to a state statute or regula-
tion. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). See also, United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
65 See Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1159 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp.
972, 974 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Gouge v. Joint School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 984, 988-89
(W.D. Wis. 1970); Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md.), aff'd
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The state action doctrine, as presently developed, does not extend
so far as to bring private institutions under color of state law in
all of their activities. However, institutions which are otherwise
"private" have been found involved in sufficient state action to
subject themselves to suits under the 14th amendment, where there
exists any one or a combination of the following: (1) state control
- either financial, constitutional, legislative, judicial, or administra-
tive;00 (2) a public function; 7 or (3) state contacts. 68  Where the
doctrine has been extended to the private school, however, it has
generally been limited to those institutions with a policy of racial
discrimination.69 "The courts have seemingly been reluctant to ex-
tend the doctrine to eliminate other kinds of activities that would be
deemed unconstitutional if performed solely by the state."70 Thus,
until the state action doctrine has been sufficiently developed to sub-
ject private institutions, in all instances, to the due process clause,
the cases involving the state-supported institutions cannot be deemed
determinative of the substantive and procedural standards required
of private schools.
2. Sovereign Immunity.- The established rule of immunity of
the states from suit in the federal courts does not preclude an equity
action to enjoin the acts of state officers or state agencies which
allegedly deprive a person of rights granted under the Constitution
per curiam, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
Contra, Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991
(1970). This court dismissed the action of a discharged teacher despite the allegation
that the discharge was in violation of his first amendment rights. The court, focusing
on Colorado statutes giving the board of trustees complete discretion in its employment
practices, concluded that Jones had not been denied his constitutional rights because the
board was under no duty to reemploy him.
66 The Supreme Court has noted that the 14th amendment "governs any action of
a State, *whether through its legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or
administrative officers.'" Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935) (per curiam),
quoting Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900).
6 7 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F.
Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
68 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
6 9 See Comment, Student Due Process in the Private University: The State Action
Doctrine, 20 SYRACUSE L REv. 911, 914-19 (1969); Comment, Judicial Intervention
in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5 WILLAMB L.J. 277 (1969).
Contra, Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Academic Freedom, 20 FLA. L REV.
290 (1968). "MThe presence of government has so far penetrated, that few colleges
are today wholly 'private' in the sense of being altogether immune to the fourteenth
amendment and the Bill of Rights." Id. at 291.
70 Cmment Student Due Process in the Private University: The State Action Doc-
trine, 20 SYRACUSE L REv. 911, 919 (1969). See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 79-80
(2d Cir. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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of the United States. In the recent case of Roth v. Board of Regents
of State Colleges,71 a nontenured professor whose employment con-
tract had not been renewed brought an action under section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 187172 for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. Defendants raised as one of their defenses the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The court, rejecting the defendants' argument,
made it clear that when a state agency or board violates federally
protected constitutional rights, "[nleither the Eleventh Amendment
nor the doctrine of Hans v. Louisiana, [134 U.S. 1 (1890)1, affords
these defendants the shield of sovereign immunity .... . Because
the proceeding is regarded as one against individuals whose action
- by virtue of the Constitution - is unlawful, state agents may
not claim for themselves the benefit of the state's immunity from
suit.74
B. Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court has held that the personal and professional
rights of teachers, as protected under the due process clause of the
14th amendment, cannot be disregarded by the states in the opera-
tion of their educational institutions: "[E]ven though the govern-
mental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liber-
ties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. ' 7'  Due process
of law therefore requires that the interests of the state and its edu-
cational institutions be balanced against the interests of the teachers
therein. The concept of "constitutional tenure" is primarily based
upon the teachers' substantive rights and protections, as set forth
below, that have recently emerged from the balancing of these
interests.
1. The employment of a teacher in a public school cannot be
terminated because he has exercised a freedom secured to him by the
Constitution of the United States. This proposition, as related to
71 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
72 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
73 310 F. Supp. at 974. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-59 (1908); Or-
leans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156, 160-51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 921 (1957).
7
'Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker, 339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); accord,
School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59, 63 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957):
"A state can act only through agents; and whether the agent be an individual officer or
corporate agency, it ceases to represent the state when it attempts to use state power in
violation of the Constitution and may be enjoined from such unconstitutional action."
75 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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the broader problem of whether public employment in general can
be conditioned upon waiver of a constitutional right, is of relatively
recent vintage. In the past, there was little doubt that public em-
ployment could be so conditioned. The oft-quoted dictum of Justice
Holmes, in the seminal case of McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 6
that one "has no constitutional right to be a policeman" 77 was dearly
taken to uphold the arbitrary denial of government employment.7
8
The Supreme Court twice held that public employment could be con-
ditioned upon a waiver of constitutional rights. In United Public
Workers v. Mitchell,"9 the Court said: "Congress may regulate the
political conduct of government employees 'within reasonable limits,'
even though the regulation trenches to some extent upon unfettered
polititcal action."8 0 And in Adler v. Board of Education,"' the Court
said:
70 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
71d. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. In a more complete form, the passage from which the
quoted statement was taken reads as follows:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free
speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered
him. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
78 Such were the judicial attitudes toward public employees in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. See Devol v. Board of Regents, 6 Ariz. 259, 56 P. 737 (1899); Hard-
gan v. Board of Regents, 49 W. Va. 14, 38 S.E. 698 (1901). See also Murphy, Aca-
demic Freedom - An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAw AND CoNTEmP. PROB.
447, 457 (1963).
However, if one looks at the sentence that follows the passage quoted in note 77,
supra, it is clear that Justice Holmes was prescribing a test of "reasonableness," not
capriciousness. Justice Holmes added: "On the same principle the city may impose
any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control." McAuliffe v. City of
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892).
79 330 U.S. 75 (1947). In Mitchell the Court upheld government interference in
activities within the scope of the first amendment under two sections of the Hatch Act
[5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-25 (1964)] which impose restrictions on federal employees en-
gaging in political activity.
80 330 U.S. at 102.
81342 U.S. 485 (1962). The Adler Court upheld as constitutional section 3022 of
the New York Education Law, N.Y. EDUC LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1949), as amended,
N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1970), which provides for the disqualification and
removal from the public school system of teachers who advocate the overthrow of the
government by unlawful means or who belong to organizations that have such a pur-
pose. Mr. Justice Minton, writing for the majority, stated:
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the at-
tirude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the
state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That
the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teach-
ers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools
as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted. 342 U.S. at 493.
The Supreme Court subsequently found section 3022 to be unconstitutionally over-
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It is clear that [New York public school employees] have the right
under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will.
It is equally clear that they have no right to work for the State in
the school system on their own terms. . . . [Tjhey are at liberty
to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.82
But the forwarning of a change in attitude was apparent from the
dissenting opinions in both of these cases. Mr. Justice Black, dissent-
ing in Mitchell, stated:
There is nothing about federal and state employees as a class
which justifies depriving them or society of the benefits of their
participation in public affairs.... I think the Constitution guaran-
tees to them the same rights that other groups of good citizens
have to engage in activities which decide who their elected repre-
sentatives shall be.8
And Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Adler, vigorously attacked
the proposition that public employees may be relegated to the posi-
tion of "second-class citizens." 8  He asserted that a person entering
public service does not and cannot be forced to sacrifice his civil
rights. "The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and ex-
pression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and none
needs it more than the teacher."85
The line of cases that followed the Adler and Mitchell deci-
sions eroded the privilege doctrine to the point that the position
espoused therein could be more accurately restated as follows: Al-
though one has no constitutional right to public employment, one
does have a constitutional interest in not being denied admittance to,
or continuation in, a position of public employment for arbitrary
and capricious reasons, or for reasons that conflict with fundamen-
tal constitutional rights.8" The first Supreme Court decision to take
this approach was the 1952 case of Wieman v. Updegraff." The
Court, faced with an arbitrary refusal by state officials to pay the
salaries of teachers and other public employees who refused to sub-
scribe to a loyalty oath, stated that to assert the "facile generaliza-
broad to the extent that it makes mere membership in the Communist party prima fade
evidence of disqualification for employment. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 591, 609-610 (1967).
82 342 U.S. at 492 (citations omitted).
88 330 U.S. at 111-12.
84 342 U.S. at 508.
85Id.
8 6 S ee Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees - An Emerging Consti-
tutiopnal Right to be a Policeman?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 409 (1968). See also
Comment, supra note 55; Note, supra note 50.
87 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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tion that there is no constitutionally protected right to public em-
ployment is to obscure the issue."'8 There "need [be no] pause to
consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It
is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the
public servant whose exclusion... is patently arbitrary or discrimina-
tory."8" Mr. Justice Black, concurring, further stated: "We must
have freedom of speech for all or we will in the long run have it for
none but the cringing and the craven .... [T~he right to speak on
matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be
wholly lost."90
By 1967, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,91 the dissenting opin-
ion in Adler had become escalated to the majority opinion of the
Court. The Keyishian Court - dearly rejecting the premise that
"public employment, including academic employment, may be condi-
tioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not
be abridged by direct government action192 - held unconstitutional
a complex statutory and regulatory scheme which was to "prevent
the appointment or retention of 'subversive' persons in state em-
ployment."93  In reaching this decision the Court stated: "Our Na-
tion is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of ortho-
doxy over the classroom."9
In 1968, the Court, in Pickering v. Board of Education, 5 again
addressed itself to first amendment rights. After a letter critical
of the school administration was sent to a local newspaper by a ten-
ured teacher, the school board dismissed the teacher on a determina-
tion that "the publication of the letter was 'detrimental to the ef-
881d. at 191.
891d. at 192; accord, Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956),
where the Court, striking down a statute that required a teacher's dismissal for exercis-
ing his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, stated: "To state that a
person does not have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say
that he must comply with the reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down
by the proper authorities." Id. at 555.
90 344 U.S. at 193.
91385 U.S. 589 (1967).
02 Id. at 605. For a statement of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see
note 55 supra. See also O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with
Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966).
93 385 U.S. at 592.
94 Id. at 603.
98 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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ficient operation and administration of the schools of the district'
.. The Court, dealing directly with the first amendment issue,
stated:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be
read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection
with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it pro-
ceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numer-
ous prior decisions of this Court.97
In Wieman, Keyishian, and Pickering the Court did not rely upon
the privilege-right dichotomy. The Court did not assert that the due
process clause provides a "right" to teach; rather, the inquiry went
to whether there is a general obligation on the part of the govern-
ment to act fairly with its employees. Utilizing the concept of a
"constitutionally protected interest,198 the Court could avoid the
necessity of finding a right to life, liberty, or property that was de-
prived without due process of law.9  Once infringement of a con-
stitutionally protected interest was at issue, due process could be used
to test the validity of the limitations put on the teacher's substantive
rights by questioning the reasonableness of their denial under the
circumstances.
2. A teacher's specific (positive) constitutional rights may be
limited only upon a showing that his activity interferes with an over-
riding public interest. Confronted with the allegation that a teacher's
constitutional freedoms have been infringed, the court must proceed
to weigh the interest of the individual teacher against the interests of
the school system and determine what safeguards are constitutionally
required. This balancing of interests required by due process
"is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a pro-
cess."' 00  "Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies
according to specific factual contexts."''1 1
961d. at 564.
971d. at 568.
9 8 See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95, 900 (1961). See
also Roth v. Board of Regent of State College, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
9 9 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See also Roth v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972, 976 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
100Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
101 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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In Pickering v. Board of Education,0 2 the Court pointed out that
"the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of
its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in con-
nection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."
The test is to "balance . . . the interests of the teacher, as a citizen
... and the interest of the State, as an employer .. 103 The stan-
dard used in this particular case was: Where the "employment is only
tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the
public communication made by a teacher ... it is necessary to regard
the teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be."'104
Recognizing that at times the interests of the state in efficient pub-
lic service and the interests of a teacher in free speech may be in con-
flict, the Court found that, in this case, the teacher's statements
were entitled to the same protections as if made by a member of
the general public; therefore, his dismissal by the board was not
justifiable.' 05
102 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
103 Id. at 568; accord, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896-98 (1961),
where the Court utilized a similar balancing approach to deny relief to a "security
risk" whose employment at a defense plant had been terminated.
104 391 U.S. at 574.
105 The Court also conceded, however, that "lilt is possible to conceive of some
positions in public employment in which the need for confidentiality is so great that
even completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for dis-
missal." Id. at 570 n.3.
Subsequent to its decision in Pickering, the Supreme Court set aside two state court
decisions with instructions to reconsider the cases in the light of the principles announced
in Pickering. In Puentes v. Board of Educ., 24 App. Div. 2d 628 (2d Dep't 1965), aff'd
chem., 18 N.Y.2d 906, 223 N.E.2d 45, 276 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1966), vacated and remanded
per curiam, 392 U.S. 653 (1968), rev'd me=., 24 N.Y.2d 996, 250 N.E.2d 232, 302
N.Y.S.2d 824 (1969), the president of the teachers' federation had been suspended with-
out pay because he wrote a letter (containing some inaccuracies, as did the statements in
Pickering) critical of the board's failure to renew the contract of a probationary teacher.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration.
Puentes v. Board of Educ., 392 U.S. 653 (1968). Upon remand [24 N.Y.2d
996, 250 N.E.2d 232, 302 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1969)) the court of appeals reversed its prior
decision, finding that the inaccuracies in the letter were related to reports to which the
teacher had no access and hence were not the result of reckless or intentional falsehood.
The court said: "Indiscreet bombast in an argumentative letter, to the limited extent
present here, is insufficient to sanction disciplinary action. Otherwise, those who criti-
cize in an area where criticism is permissible would either be discouraged from exercis-
ing their right or would be required to do so in such innocuous terms as would make
the criticism seem ineffective or obsequious." Id. at 998-99, 250 N.E.2d at 233, 302
N.Y.S.2d at 826. Since the contents of the letter were arguably within the free speech
protection laid down in Pickering, the court ordered reinstatement of the teacher.
In an Alaska case, Watts v. Seward School Bd., 395 P.2d 372 (Alas. 1964), re-
manded per curiam, 381 U.S. 126 (1965), aff'd, 421 P.2d 586, reh. denied, 423 P.2d
678 (Alas. 1967), vacated and remanded per curiam, 391 U.S. 592 (1968), afl'd, 454
P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970), teachers were dismissed for
distributing an open letter containing false statements disparaging the superintendent.
Here too the Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded for further consideration.
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The Pickering doctrine was followed in Los Angeles Teachers
Union v. Los Angeles City Board of Education.1' Members of the
Los Angeles Teachers Union wished to circulate, during duty-free
periods, petitions directed to state officials seeking an increase in
state support of public education. The school board refused to allow
the circulation on the grounds that a controversial petition would
cause unrest among the staff, and that the circulation would disturb
teachers who were trying to work. The union sought a court order
to compel the board to permit the petition to circulate. Quoting
from Pickering, the Supreme Court of California said that it "must
strike 'a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs through its employees.' "107 In striking this bal-
ance the California court held that the government had no valid
interest in restricting this speech-related activity simply in order to
avert the sort of disturbance which is inevitably generated by the
expression of ideas that are controversial. The court directed the
school board to allow the teachers to circulate the petitions.
Balancing approaches similar to those in Pickering and Los An-
geles Teachers Union have also been used by federal district courts.
In Friedman v. Union Free School District,'0 8 an action was brought
by the Bay Shore Classroom Teachers' Association challenging
the right of the board of education to prohibit distribution in
teachers' mailboxes of publications by the Association other than
"routine internal distributions." The Association claimed that the
distribution rule deprived teachers of their right to free speech in
violation of the first and 14th amendments. The school board argued
that as owner of the school premises it had the absolute right to di-
rect how its facilities could be used, and that the distribution rule
was necessary to keep the school premises free and clean of all litter.
The court, citing prior holdings of the Supreme Court which had
Watts v. Seward School Bd., 391 U.S. 592 (1968). The Supreme Court of Alaska, upon
remand [454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970)), reaffirmed
its prior decision, holding that the situation did not fall under the Pickering doctrine
in that the statements and actions of the teachers were detrimental to the school district
and caused disharmony among the staff. None of the statements concerned matters on
which the public voted; rather, they were in the nature of grievances which should
have been pursued through established school procedures. For these reasons the teach-
ers' dismissals were held to be justified.
10671 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
107Id. at 558, 455 P.2d at 831, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
108 314 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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stated that such authority as claimed by the board must be exercised
consistently with fundamental constitutional safeguard's, found that
the interests of the school board could hardly be deemed so substan-
tial as to justify denial of first amendment rights. The court held
the distribution rule to be "void on its face and in its application as an
overbroad prohibition of the First Amendment rights .... "I
In Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges,"" a district
court ordered the school board to provide a nontenured teacher
with a statement of the reasons for nonrenewal of his contract and
a hearing at which those reasons could be challenged by the teacher.
Relying on Pickering, the court noted: "A teacher's freedom of speech
cannot be limited unless it can be shown that his utterances harm a
substantial public interest.""' Because the plaintiff was a nonten-
ured university professor, the case also illustrates that courts have be-
come highly sensitive to interferences with any teachers's specific con-
stitutional rights, whether the teacher is tenured or not."
3. Tenured and nontenured teachers alike are protected against
deprivation of their specific (positive) constitutional rights. This
view was taken as early as 1947 in Bomar v. Keyes." 3 There a
probationary teacher was discharged under a New York statute be-
cause of her absence while exercising her privilege to serve on a
federal jury. The law under which she was discharged allowed
the discharge of a probationary teacher for any reason or for no rea-
son at all." 4 An appeal to the commissioner of education was dis-
missed on the ground that the teacher "had not secured permanent
tenure.""'  On appeal to the second circuit under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871,11 Judge Learned Hand stated that
even if "her discharge by the Board was not a breach of contract
.... it may have been the termination of an expectancy of continued
employment, and that is an injury to an interest which the law will
109 Id. at 229.
11o 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
"'Id. at 980-81.
1 1 2 See id. at 976; Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969);
McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d
177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d
136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112
(D. Mass. 1969).
113 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
114 Id. at 139.
115Id. at 138.
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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protect against invasion by acts themselves unlawful, such as the de-
nial of a federal privilege. '" 7
In Shelton v. Tucker,"8 the Supreme Court held invalid a state
statute that required teachers in state-supported schools and col-
leges to file an affidavit listing all of their organizational affiliations
over the preceding 5 years. A class action was brought by a teacher
whose contract was not renewed because he refused to file the re-
quired affidavit. Holding that the statute deprived teachers of their
right to associational freedom as protected by the 14th amendment,
the Court alluded to the absence of tenure protections in Arkansas:
These provisions [of the state statutel must be considered
against the existing system of teacher employment required by
Arkansas law. Teachers there are hired on a year-to-year basis.
They are not covered by a civil service system, and they have no
job security beyond the end of each school year.119
Although the implication by the Court that the consititutional pro-
tection afforded a teacher is in some fashion determined by looking
to the existence of state tenure laws seems specious, the Court's lan-
guage, nevertheless, seems to carry with it the notion that the con-
stitutional rights of a nontenured teacher require even closer pro-
tection by the courts than those of the tenured teacher since the
nontenured teacher is subject to more employment pressures.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Branch,2 ° a teacher's yearly contract
was not renewed because of her involvement in civil rights activities.
The state statute under consideration did not provide for tenure and
provided that all contracts were for only 1 year, renewable at the
discretion of the school authorities. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in directing the school board to renew the teacher's
contract, stated that it is "beyond cavil that the state may not force
the plaintiff to choose between exercising her legitimate constitu-
tional rights and her right of equality of opportunity to hold public
employment."''
In McLaughlin v. Tilendis122 - an action brought by probation-
117 162 F.2d at 139. Judge Hand pointed out that "[c]ertainly there are 'reason-
able' limits to the exercise of her privilege; but the question whether she kept within
such limits ... must be tried ...." Id.
118 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
119 Id. at 482.
120 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
121Id. at 180.
122 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). See also Pred. v. Board of Public Instruction,
415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969), reversing the trial court's dismissal of a suit by teachers
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ary teachers under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871123
- the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a teacher's
right to join a union is protected by the first amendment. Thus, the
school board could not dismiss or refuse to renew the contract of a
nontenured teacher because of his exercise of that constitutional right.
In the recent case of Jones v. Hopper,'24 however, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit seemed to revert to a tenure-nontenure
distinction, allowing conditions to be placed on a nontenured teacher
that presumably would be unconstitutional if placed on a tenured
teacher. Jones, a nontenured associate professor, sued the president
and the board of trustees of the state college for damages arising
from their refusal to renew a contract of employment for the coming
academic year. The complaint alleged that Jones was denied a re-
newal of his contract for the sole reason that he sought to exercise
his constitutional rights of speech, publication, and religion . 5  The
district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. The latter court held that in the absence of tenure
or an existing contract of employment, the refusal to renew his con-
tract does not deprive a teacher of any constitutional rights for pur-
poses of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.126 The court
appeared to recognize extremely broad discretionary power in the
university administration when it stated: "Because of the special
needs of the university, both public and private, great discretion
must be given it in decisions about the renewal of contracts during
the probationary period. In deciding whether to rehire or grant
tenure, the considerations involved go well beyond a judgment about
general teaching competency."'2 7 Although the decision may be ex-
plained by the traditional caution of courts not to delve into the maze
of symbiotic relationships that may exist among the various com-
ponent constituencies of a university, the effect of such judicial
alleging that their contracts were not renewed because of their participation in a teach-
ers' association and their advocacy of campus freedom.
12342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
124 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970).
125The complaint specifically alleged that the nonrenewal decision was based on
Jones' objection to the disqualification of an applicant for the English department be-
cause he was an Oriental, Jones' newspaper attack upon the English department's text-
book, his founding of a student-faculty publication which criticized the Viet Nam war
and commented on other coatroversal matters, and his support for a student who claimed
conscientious objector status. Id. at 1326.
12042 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
127 410 F.2d at 1329, quoting Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom,
supra note 20, at 1101.
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timidity is to jeopardize the position of any nontenured teacher.
Such a judicial posture can only result in a first amendment chill-
ing effect, thus inhibiting an otherwise free exchange of ideas.
The Jones decision, however, seems to represent the minority
position; it is inconsistent with cases that preceded it, as reviewed
above, and with subsequent state and federal decisions. In Williams
v. School District,128 a nontenured high school teacher alleged that
she was not reemployed in a Missouri school system because of a
speech that she had made before the Classical Association. The
speech, which was subsequently published in the association's journal,
included an evaluation of the comparative emphasis placed on athlet-
ics as opposed to scholarly pursuits in the public schools. The super-
intendent told the teacher that he found the speech offensive and
that he would recommend that she not be reemployed. The trial
court dismissed the entire complaint, and the teacher appealed. The
Supreme Court of Missouri held that while the board does not have
to reemploy a teacher, does not have to set out grounds for nonre-
tention, and does not have to grant the teacher a hearing upon non-
retention, "a school board's right not to rehire a teacher must not be
on grounds that are violative of a teacher's constitutional right."'129
Accordingly, the court ordered the reinstatement of that part of the
teacher's complaint that charged violation of a constitutional right
and remanded the case for a trial on that issue.
The Williams court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Pickering v. Board of Education,3 ' which involved facts
similar to those before the Missouri court. Although Pickering dealt
with the dismissal of a tenured teacher, the broad language of the
opinion suggests (as the Williams court apparently found) that the
Court did not intend to limit the protection of first amendment rights
to tenured teachers.
In Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges,'' Judge Doyle
stated that "substantive constitutional protection is unaffected by the
presence or absence of tenure under state law.' '1 32  Similarly, in
Gouge v. Joint School District,' Judge Doyle said that the satisfac-
tion of the requisites of state law is not determinative of "whether
128 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969).
129 Id. at 265.
130 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see text accompanying notes 95-97, 102-05 supra.
131 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970); see text accompanying notes 110-12
supra.
132 310 F. Supp. at 976; see cases cited in note 112 supra.
133 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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the defendants met the minimum requirements of substantive... due
process... in coming to the decision not to renew the plaintiffs' con-
tracts."134
A federal district court in Indiana, in the case of Roberts v. Lake
Central School Corp.,'35 found that the constitutional rights of a
nontenured elementary school teacher had been abridged when a
school system refused to rehire him because of a comment respect-
ing the school board's bargaining tactics that he had made before a
teachers' association. The principal of the school called the teacher
in, charged that the statement was untrue, and demanded an apology;
the teacher refused. When the teacher again refused to apologize be-
fore the superintendent, he was told that his nonretention would be
recommended. The district court, finding that the comment did not
threaten the efficient operation of the school, ordered the teacher
reemployed. The court stated that if school boards were permitted
not to renew teachers' contracts because of critical statements, "there
would be a serious impairment in the freedom of teachers to speak
out on issues concerning them."'13 6
In light of the above discussion it becomes fairly clear that,
whether a teacher is tenured or nontenured, most courts will not
tolerate a termination or nonrenewal of a teacher's contract by a
state agency when such action is spurred by the teacher's exercise
of a specific constitutional right. However, what of the teacher who
cannot allege infringement of a specific constitutional right, but only
that the school administration's termination or nonrenewal of his
contract was arbitrary and capricious? How may the Constitution
protect him? If the teacher is tenured, the courts will generally
find it unnecessary to reach basic constitutional issues; rather, they
can ensure fairness by demanding strict adherence to the existing
administrative safeguards, and, if necessary, interpreting the tenure
requirements in such a way that rational treatment is most likely to
be afforded an employee. Where the teacher in question is non-
tenured, however, courts have differed in their result. Some find a
general due process right; some do not.
Mr. Justice Cardozo has characterized the protection of the indi-
vidual from arbitrary action by the state as the very essence of due
process. 37 The Supreme Court in Wieman v. Updegraff,38 reaf-
'34 Id. at 989.
135 317 . Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
IN8 Id. at 65.
1 3 7 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Udil. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937).
138 344 U.S. 183 (1952); see text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
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firmed that position with the statement: "[C]onstitutional protection
does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a stat-
ute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. ' ' 139  And recently, in
Norton v. Macy,'4° where a civil service employee was dismissed as
unfit because of his alleged homosexual activity, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated: "The Govern-
ment's obligation to accord due process sets at least minimal sub-
stantive limits on its prerogative to dismiss its employees: it forbids
all dismissals which are arbitrary and capricious." '141
4. A teacher, whether tenured or nontenured, should be pro-
tected by the due process clause of the 14th amendment against dis-
missal or nonretention which is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly with-
out basis in fact. In Birnbaum v. Trussell,'42 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reasoned that "whenever there is a substantial
interest, other than employment by the state, involved in the discharge
of a public employee, he [cannot] be removed . . .on arbitrary
grounds .... .,143 Here, where a physician had been dismissed from
a municipal hospital due to his alleged anti-Negro bias and without
a hearing on the specific allegations, the court found two vital in-
terests were threatened: reputation and the ability to pursue a pro-
fession effectively. The court stated: "Both are ordinarily accorded
meticulous protection ...to prevent direct injury by arbitrary state
action."' 44
Because of the teaching profession's limited employment oppor-
tunities - the state being the main and often the sole employer - a
teacher's discharge for an arbitrary or capricious reason would be no
less damaging to his future career than a discharge for untested al-
legations of racial prejudice would be to a doctor's career. Thus, in
Lucia v. Duggan,'4 5 where a nontenured teacher was summarily dis-
139 344 U.S. at 192.
140 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
141 Id. at 1164. In making its finding the court emphasized the fact that a "badge
of infamy" may attach to alleged homosexuality.
It should be noted that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has taken the most critical view of administrative terminations based upon conduct un-
related to employment, such as homosexuality. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, on the other hand, has accepted the contention that private homosexual acts
can be the basis for discharge. Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
142 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
143 Id. at 678.
144 d. at 678-79 n.13.
145 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
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missed for wearing a beard, Judge Garrity, citing the Birnbaum de-
cision, stated:
Whatever the derivation and scope of [the nontenured teacher's]
alleged freedom to wear a beard, it is at least an interest of his,
especially in combination with his professional reputation as a
school teacher, which may not be taken from him without due pro-
cess of law. ... Plaintiff's interest in wearing a beard and in his
career as a teacher is not nullified by his having been employed less
than the three years required to achieve tenure status.146
But in Freeman v. Gould Special School District,14 7 the eighth cir-
cuit reached a different result. Six Negro teachers in Lincoln
County, Arkansas asserted that the decision of the school board not
to renew their contracts of employment was based on racial discrimi-
nation. Arkansas law did not provide for a tenure system; teachers
were employed under annual contracts with automatic renewal unless
written notice to the contrary was given within a prescribed time.'48
The court declared that in the absence of a tenure statute a local
school board has the absolute right to decline to employ or reemploy
any teacher as long as its decision is not violative of a specific
constititutional right such as race, religion, freedom of association,
or the right against self-incrimination. 49 The court found no evi-
dence to support the teachers' allegation that the board's decision was
racially discriminatory; rather, the decision appeared to be based on
the recommendation of the local Negro principal, with whom the
teachers had had several personal conflicts. Absent evidence of dis-
crimination, the court held that no federal question was presented;
the board's decision, even if it was arbitrary and capricious, violated
none of the teachers' rights. Noting that "there are many public
employees who are separated from their employment by a purely
arbitrary decision," the court rejected the teachers' contention that
"the Board must accord due process, both substantive and proce-
dural, in all of its operative procedures."' 150 The onus of an immi-
nent flood of litigation must have lurked in the Freeman court's
mind when it observed that under a contrary decision, "there could
only be... a discharge for cause, with the school board carrying the
burden of showing that the discharge was for a permissible rea-
14'ld. at 117-18.
147405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
14 8 It should be noted that subsequent to the decision in Freeman a statewide teacher
tenure law was adopted by the Arkansas legislature. See NATIONAL EDUCATION
Ass'N OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 9, at 33.
149405 F.2d at 1159.
150Id. at 1160.
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son.""'- The court felt that such a holding would render the tenure
laws useless in the states which had adopted them.
The Freeman court had to distinguish the Supreme Court decision
of Slochower v. Board of Higher Education.52 The court did so
by stating that the Slochower case "applied to a tenure situation and
an unconstitutional city charter provision" which mandated the dis-
charge of city employees who relied upon the fifth amendment.53
The court also had to contend with Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners," which held that a general due process right protecting a per-
son against arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable state action exists
in the area of state licensing. The majority in Freeman distinguished
that case on the ground that it "dealt with the general right to prac-
tice a profession, and did not deal with the narrower question of a
right to specific employment." 55
Judge Lay, dissenting in Freeman, met the tenure issue head-on:
The majority opinion assumes that the protective cloak of the due
process clause as enunciated in Slochower . . . does not apply to a
public school teacher who is without tenure .... I disagree. Con-
stitutional rights of public school teachers are not conditioned upon
state tenure laws. The entire discussion of "tenure" is irrelevant
to the facts here. Slochower does not turn upon recognition of
tenure laws but upon the denial of the "protection of the indi-
vidual against arbitrary action" which violates due process of
law.156
Judge Lay felt that a school board cannot arbitrarily or capriciously
refuse to renew a teacher's contract. He asserted that "the right to
the specified job is not in issue; rather, the focal stake is the personal
liberty to pursue one's employment without arbitrary vilification and
reckless exclusion by the state." 5' The dissent further contended
that the extension of this limited general due process right to the
area of public employment would not result in either a flood of
151 Id.
152 350 U.S. 551 (1956). In Slochower, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held unconsti-
tutional the summary dismissal of a tenured teacher under a New York City Charter
provision that provided for the automatic dismissal of any city employee exercising his
fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination to avoid answering a question re-
lating to his official conduct. Because no inference of guilt could be made from the
exercise of the privilege, the Court found the dismissal "wholly without support." Id.
at 559.
153405 F.2d at 1159.
154 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (a state cannot deny a person the opportunity to take a
bar examination except for reasons which are related to a valid state purpose).
155 405 F.2d at 1159.
156Id. at 1163.
157 Id. at 1165 (emphasis omitted).
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litigation or an imposed tenure system as feared by the majority.
In particular, Judge Lay pointed out that "[wlhen the board's dis-
cretion is challenged, the burden of proof always remains on the
plaintiff to demonstrate impermissible grounds" for the board's ac-
tion.16 8
Despite the stand taken by the Freeman majority, the principal
announced by the Birnbaum court has found recent application. In
Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges,'59 Judge Doyle stated:
"The balancing test of Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy [367 U.S. 886
(1960)] compels the conclusion that under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment the decision not to retain a professor em-
ployed by a state university may not rest on a basis wholly unsup-
ported in fact .. . ."160 He noted that this standard should be con-
siderably less severe than the standard of "cause" as applied in the
dismissal of tenured professors. Thus, it cannot be said that the
prescribed protections constitute judicially-imposed tenure for all
teachers. Judge Doyle then quoted the controlling language from
Birnbaum: "[W]henever there is a substantial interest, other than
employment by the state, involved in the discharge of a public em-
ployee, he [cannot] be removed.., on arbitrary grounds .... 161
Judge Doyle reasserted this position with regard to elementary school
teachers in Gouge v. joint School District.62
5. A teacher should be protected by the due process clause of
the 14th amendment against a dismissal or nonretention decision
which is wholly without reason. Although the Supreme Court has
never had to decide the specific question of whether a dismissal or
nonretention for no reason is subject to challenge, it has had occa-
sion to speak on the issue. In Vitarelli v. Seaton,163 for example,
a government employee had been suspended from the Department
of the Interior as a "security risk." Although the Court ordered the
employee reinstated because the secretary did not comply with de-
partmental regulations, it indicated in dictum that there is no con-
stitutional proscription against summary dismissal of an unprotected
158Id. at 1167.
159 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970). See also Hetrick v. Martin, 322 F. Supp.
545 (ED. Ky. 1971), denying defendants' motion to dismiss a suit by a teacher whose
contract was not renewed because she was "unsociable" and her assignments were "in-
conclusive." Mrs. Hetrick alleged that her nonretention was in fact based on her class-
room discussions of the Viet Nam war and the draft system.
160 310 F. Supp. at 979.
161 Id.
162 310 F. Supp. 984, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
103 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
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employee for no stated reason."" One could argue, however, that
since there is always a reason for action, regardless of how obscure,
a dismissal that is totally unexplained and alleged to be for "no
reason" is the essence of arbitrariness and capriciousness.
Chief Justice Weintraub, in his concurring opinion in Zimmer-
man v. Board of Education,'65 although refusing to pass on the ques-
tion, does suggest the availability of such an argument:
[I]f we may inquire into "unreasonableness" [of the dismissal], it
would seem to follow that there must be a "reason," i.e., "cause"
for refusal to continue the teacher into a tenure status. That
course has its difficulties. It would not mean the court would not
recognize a wide range of "reasons" or would lightly disagree with
the employer's finding that the "reason" in fact existed ...
[However, it may] involve some practical problems in the adminis-
tration of a school system.
I think the question might well be left for another day .... 16
Support for this protection against dismissal or nonretention for
no reason is found in recent cases which have held that a nonten-
ured teacher must be informed of the charges against him prior to
the termination of his employment. In both Roth v. Board of Re-
gents of State Colleges 67 and Gouge v. Joint School District,68 Judge
Doyle expressed the view that a teacher is protected by the due pro-
cess clause against nonrenewal which is "wholly without reason. '
The Lucia v. Duggan171 case vividly exhibits the interest of the
teacher in not being dismissed without reason. The court, after find-
ing that the dismissed teacher had "attempted unsuccessfully to se-
cure employment elsewhere as a public school teacher,"'171 stated:
"It is fairly inferable that one reason, if not the only one, why plain-
tiff has been unable to secure employment as a public school teacher
is because he was dismissed by the . . . school committee for no
stated reasons.""17.2
Moreover, under a dismissal or nonretention for no reason, it is
more difficult for the teacher to prove that the motive of the school
administration was constitutionally proscribed. And knowing that
164 Id. at 539-40.
16538 N.J. 65, 183 A.2d 25 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 956 (1963).
166 Id. at 80, 183 A.2d at 33 (concurring opinion).
167310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
168310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
169 310 F. Supp. at 979, 991.
170 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
171Id. at 116.
172 Id.
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it must give a reason for its actions, the administration will be wary
of dismissing a teacher for exercising a specific constitutional right.
It might be argued that requiring that dismissal or nonretention
be based upon some stated reason affords the nontenured teacher the
full protection enjoyed by tenured teachers, who can be dismissed
only for cause. This argument was recently met by the Rhode Is-
land commissioner of education in Domenicone v. School Commit-
tee."' There, a probationary teacher, after requesting a statement
of charges and a hearing concerning nonrenewal of his contract,
was told by the school board that such notice and a hearing were
afforded only to tenured teachers or to teachers dismissed during the
school year, and not to probationary teachers whose contracts were
not renewed. The commissioner of education did not accept this
distinction: "The provision in the [state statute] ...which states
that a teacher who has acquired tenure shall not be dismissed with-
out good and just cause should not be construed to imply that a
teacher who has not acquired tenure may be dismissed without
cause." 174 But the commissioner did believe that the cause for dis-
missal of a nontenured teacher could be less than that required to
dismiss a tenured teacher. He concluded that "simple justice as
provided not only by the laws of this state but by the Constitution
of the United States demands that [the teacher] know the cause for
dismissal or non-renewal of contract."175
6. With regard to a teacher's substantive due process protec-
tions, it should be immaterial whether his employment is terminated
during a given contract period, or not renewed for a subsequent
period. In Jones v. Hoppe,7'7 the petitioner relied on Bomar v.
Keyes177 in support of the contention that he was denied an "expec-
tancy" of continued employment when his contract was not renewed.
Noting that Bomar, a nontenured teacher, was dismissed during her
contract period, the Jones court distinguished that case on the ground
that the "interest" protected was a contract of employment and the
"expectancy" was that of continuing employment until the expira-
tion of the contract. The Jones court found no "interest" to be pro-
173 Opinion of the Rhode Island Commissioner of Education (May 20, 1970), re-
viewed in 48 NEA REsEARCH BULL. 90 (Oct 1970).
174 Id., 48 NEA RESEARCH BULL at 91-92.
175 Id., 48 NEA RiSEARCH BULL. at 92.
176410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970).
177 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
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tected where nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract is based
on arbitrary or retaliatory reasons. 178
Better reasoned opinions were given in the Roth v. Board of Re-
gents of State Colleges"9 and McLaughlin v. Tilendis'80 cases, where
the courts found that substantive constitutional protection makes no
distinction as to "whether employment is terminated during a given
contract period, or not renewed for a subsequent period."'' And in
Domenicone v. School Committee,'82 the commissioner stated that the
only difference between nonrenewal and discharge is the point in
time of the action taken against the teacher; therefore, in practice
they are the same. Although the Roth and McLaughlin courts
were referring to the protection of first amendment rights, the same
protection should be afforded to any rights which have emerged as
substantive due process requirements. A nontenured teacher's pro-
tection against actions which are arbitrary, capricious, without basis
in fact, or, as in Domenicone, for no stated reason, should apply in
both dismissal and nonrenewal situations.
In summary, the evolving guidelines for substantive due process
require that where the dismissal or nonretention of a faculty mem-
ber, tenured or nontenured, impinges upon a specific constitutional
right, the state shall not prevail unless it can show that the teacher's
exercise of such a constitutionally protected right harms a substan-
tial public interest. Of course, this requires a rational connection
between the proscribed activity and the particular interests of the
educational system. Where no specific constitutional right is at
issue, but rather the administration's action is arbitrary, capricious,
without basis in fact, or based upon no stated reason, the courts
have looked to other factors such as damage to reputation and career
opportunities in order to invoke the due process clause. Although
the courts differ in their results where the balancing does not involve
specific (positive) constitutional rights, the more progressive courts
have recognized that dismissal or nonretention for arbitrary or capri-
cious reasons, or for no reason, can effectively mask a constitution-
ally impermissible discharge. Where the hidden reason for such a
discharge is the teacher's exercise of a first amendment right, the
178410 F.2d at 1327-29.
17' 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
180 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
181 310 F. Supp. at 976; see 398 F.2d at 289.
182 Opinion of the Rhode Island Commissioner of Education (May 20, 1970), re-
viewed in 48 NEA RESEARCH BuLL. 90, (Oct. 1970).
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dismissal or nonretention could have a significant chilling effect on
the exercise of those rights by nontenured teachers. 83
C. Procedural Due Process
In order to properly safeguard a person's substantive rights, the
due process clause provides that certain procedural requirements
must be satisfied. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once observed: "The
history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of pro-
cedural safeguards."'" Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been
somewhat vague in dealing with the procedural rights of govern-
ment employees. Moreover, in -the area of education, administrators
have effectively argued that the question of a teacher's competence is
one peculiarly within the discretion of the teacher's superiors since
such competence is judgmental and is not readily susceptible to fac-
tual determination in an adversarial proceeding. However, as the
courts more clearly articulate constitutional principles of procedural
due process and recognize that even sincere administrators are often
arbitrary, they are becoming more dubious of the academic admin-
istrator's assertion that the esoteric relationship between the admin-
istration and the teacher should not be subject to judicial review.
This trend is evinced by the increasing number of cases in which the
courts are recognizing the teacher's right to 14th amendment proce-
dural due process protections. 8 5  The protections discussed below
have emerged from such cases.
18 3 Generally, first amendment freedoms, and the chilling thereof, have been
scrupulously protected. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
184 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). Historically, procedural
due process may be traced directly as far back as 1215 when, in the Magna Carta, the
Crown agreed, as to a limited class of persons, not to proceed summarily but only after
notice and a hearing given in accordance with "the law of the land."
385 See, e.g., Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). "The particular
circumstances of a dismissal of a public school teacher provide compelling reasons for
application of a doctrine of procedural due process." Id. at 118. See also Roth v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Gouge v.
Joint School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970). But cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton,
359 U.S. 535 (1959), where the Court implied that so long as procedural rules for
the dismissal of government employees (here an unprotected employee of the Depart-
ment of the Interior) are present, the administrator must comply with those procedures;
absent such rules, the Constitution places no restrictions on dismissals of unprotected
employees.
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 899 (1961), reveals the vulnerability of government employees' substantive rights
in the absence of procedural safeguards. In that case the majority upheld the summary
dismissal of a short-order cook employed at a defense plant because she failed to meet
certain regulatory and contractual "security requirements." Mr. Justice Brennan ob-
served:
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1. Notice of the specific reasons for the institution's intended
nonretention of the teacher is required. The inference is present
in several cases that information as to cause and an opportunity to
dispute the stated cause must be afforded where the dismissal will
grievously affect the public employee's career opportunities. In
Birnbaum v. Trussell,186 the court stated that "whenever there is a
substantial interest, other than employment by the state, involved in
the discharge of a public employee, he [cannot] be removed . ..
without a procedure calculated to determine whether legitimate
grounds do exist."' 17 In a footnote, the court further stated: "It is
clear that [the] refusal to give appellant a copy of the charges was
as much a denial of his rights as an absolute refusal to allow him a
hearing."' 88
In Lucia v. Duggan,'189 the plaintiff was not told that his refusal
to remove his beard would result in his dismissal. Plaintiff was
forced to guess what the charges against him were and what action,
if any, the school committee might take. The court, finding a vio-
lation of due process stated: "On the latter point, at least, plaintiff
may have guessed wrong. No reason has been advanced by the de-
fendants as to why plaintiff should have been forced to make these
guesses.' ' 90
In Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges,'9' Judge Doyle
stated: "Substantive constitutional protection for a university profes-
sor against nonretention in violation of his First Amendment rights
or arbitrary non-retention is useless without procedural safeguards.
... [M]inimal procedural due process includes a statement of the
[T]he mere assertion by government that exclusion is for a valid reason fore-
closes further inquiry. That is, unless the government official is foolish
enough to admit what he is doing - and few will be so foolish after today's
decision - he may employ "security requirements" as a blind behind which
to dismiss at will for the most discriminatory of causes.
Such a result in effect nullifies the substantive right - not to be ar-
bitrarily injured by Government - which the Court purports to recognize.
What sort of a right is it which enjoys absolutely no procedural protection?
Id. at 900.
186 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cit. 1966).
187 Id. at 678.
188 Id. at 679 n.15. "Whatever knowledge Dr. Birnbaum may have gleaned about
the charges against him from hospital rumors was not the 'notice' which the due process
clause requires. A party against whom the Government is proceeding is entitled to be
apprised by the Government, with some precision and specificity, of its reasons for so
doing." Id.
189303 F. Supp. 112 (1969).
190 Id. at 118.
191310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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reasons why the university intends not to retain the professor .... ,192
The same principle was held to apply to elementary school teachers
in Gouge v. Joint School District.
In a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Fer-
guson v. Thomas,'94 the rights of a nontenured teacher to procedural
due process were again considered. Although in this instance the
dismissal of a university professor for cause was upheld, the appel-
late court listed the minimal requirements of procedural due process
for one who has an expectancy of continued employment. Where
the termination for cause is opposed, these requirements include no-
tice of "the cause or causes for termination in sufficient detail to
fairly enable [the teacheri to show any error that may exist .... ,9 5
2. The teacher should be given a hearing and notice thereof.
Generally speaking the courts do not delineate a right to notice of a
hearing separate from a right to the hearing itself. But it has been
specifically stated in both the Roth and Gouge cases that minimal
procedural due process requires that "notice of a hearing" be pro-
vided the teacher.'9 Of course, the right to notice of a hearing will
be dependent upon finding a right to the hearing itself.
In Birnbaum the court noted the significance of a hearing when
it stated that "it is readily apparent that whatever injury appellant
has suffered was a result of his being denied a hearing. . . . [Al
full hearing was the only way appellant's substantial interests could
have been protected ... The court held that denial of such a
hearing afforded Birnbaum a right of action for injuries suffered in
consequence thereof.9 8 The courts in Roth, Gouge, and Ferguson
also found that minimal procedural due process includes a hearing. 9
192 Id. at 979-80. The Roth court was quick to point out that "ti]t should dearly
be understood that any more stringent requirements imposed by statute, custom, or
otherwise, such as a showing of 'cause' in the case of a tenured professor, are unaffected
by this statement of minimal *procedural requirements embodied in the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" Id. at 980 n.3.
193 310 F. Supp. 984, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
194430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
195Id at 856, followed in Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970) (non-
tenured principal with 11 years of employment in the school system should have been
accorded Ferguson minimal due process standards when his 1-year contract was not
renewed after he criticized the school board at a PTA meeting).
196 Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972, 980 (W.D. Wis.
1970); Gouge v. Joint School Dist, 310 F. Supp. 984, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
1 9 7 Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1966).
198 Id.
109 Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970); Roth v. Board of
Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972, 980 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Gouge v. Joint
School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 984, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Cafeteria Workers v. McE1-
roy,200 upheld the denial of a hearing to a short-order cook who had
been dismissed because she did not meet the "security requirements"
of the defense plant where she worked. The Court stated that it was
satisfied that "under the circumstances of this case such a procedure
was not constitutonally required."' 0' 1 However, in a vigorous dissent,
Mr. Justice Brennan, quoting from Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath,2 0 2 stated: "fT]he right to be heard before being
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may
not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a
principle basic to our society."2 3
A more recent example of a court upholding the denial of a
hearing may be found in DeCanio v. School Committee..20  The
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, adhering to the majority opinion
in Cafeteria Workers and disagreeing with the Roth and Gouge
decisions, upheld a lower court decision denying six nontenured
teachers the right to a hearing. The teachers had been suspended for
7 days due to their unauthorized absence when they joined parents
and citizens in a "liberation school." At a hearing on the sus-
pensions, their request for a continuance and a public hearing was
denied, the school committee voting instead to terminate the teach-
ers' contracts. The committee also voted to hold a closed hearing
on the dismissals, but the teachers declined to attend. (Due to lack
of notice of the specific charges against the plaintiffs, the trial judge
did not view this refusal to attend the closed hearing as a waiver by
the teachers.) Instead, they brought a suit seeking reinstatement.0 '
The teachers contended that the lack of a hearing on the dis-
missal deprived them of due process. The Massachusetts court dis-
agreed with the decision of the district court in the Roth and Gouge
cases and said that it "chose to follow the greater weight of author-
ity," noting that "[m]ost of the cases in which the question [of the
dismissal of a nontenured teacher] has been considered have con-
cluded that in the absence of a statute to the contrary a probationary
200 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
201 Id. at 894.
202 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
203 367 U.S. at 901.
204 260 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1971). It should be noted that subsequent to the DeCanio decision the Massachusetts
legislature enacted statutory changes granting additional rights to probationary teachers.
See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, §§ 42, 42B (Supp. 1971).
205 260 N.E.2d at 678.
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teacher may be dismissed without a hearing." ' ,' The court concluded
that the Massachusetts statute, which provided a hearing to tenured
teachers but not to nontenured teachers, did not violate the Consti-
tution of the United States.207
3. The teacher should have the opportunity to be present at the
hearing and respond to the stated reasons for nonretention. A sig-
nificant case dealing with the right to confrontation is Greene v.
McElroy.20 In Greene the Government's revocation of an aeronau-
tical engineer's security clearance, without a full hearing, resulted in
termination of his employment. The Supreme Court held that the
security clearance revocation, which was based on information re-
ceived from unidentified persons, deprived Greene of "the traditional
procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." 20 9
In so deciding, the Court sated that among "relatively immutable"
principles of our jurisprudence is one which holds that "where gov-
ernmental action seriously injures an individual and the reasonable-
ness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to
prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so
that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue." 1'
The rule espoused in Greene has likewise been followed in cases
involving teachers. In the Roth case, for example, the court held
"that minimal procedural due process includes . . . a hearing at
which [the teacherl may respond to the stated reasons [for nonreten-
tion] . .. if the professor appears at the appointed time and place.
At such a hearing the professor must have a reasonable opportunity
to submit evidence relevant to the stated reasons."211 The same prin-
206 Id. at 680-81.
2071d. at 681.
208360 U.S. 474 (1959).
209Id. at 493.
210 Id. at 496.
211 Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972, 980 (W.D. Wis.
1970).
Although the courts do not appear to have dealt with the issue, it seems clear that
the nontenured teacher's right to be present at the hearing should be complimented by
the right to also have legal counsel present at the hearing. The right to counsel serves
to insure that the teacher is afforded maximum fairness at the hearing and that his
interests are most effectively served by his appearance. Committee A of the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) has alluded to the nontenured teacher's
right to counsel in its 1968 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Free-
dom and Tenure, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 448 (1968). Section 10 of the proposed reg-
ulations provides that where a nontenured faculty member "alleges that considerations
violative of academic freedom significantly contributed to a decision not to reappoint
him" and his allegations have not been resolved by informal methods, if the appropriate
"committee so recommends, the matter will be heard in the manner set forth in Regula-
tions 5 and 6 . I..." ld. at 451. Sestion 5(c) (3), one of the regulations referred to
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ciple was held to apply to elementary school teachers in Gouge.
And in Ferguson, the fifth circuit stated that the nontenured
teacher "must be accorded a meaningful opportunity to be heard in
his own defense ...... In this respect he must be "advised of the
names and nature of the testimony of witnesses against him .... "212
In summary, the emerging substantive rights of nontenured
teachers can be realized only if they are protected by the procedural
due process requirements of (1) notice of the specific reasons for
dismissal or nonretention, (2) a hearing on those reasons and notice
of such a hearing, and (3) the opportunity to be present at the hear-
ing and to respond to the stated reasons for dismissal or nonreten-
tion. These procedural requirements are basic standards which the
more sagacious courts have recognized as being necessary to pro-
tect the teacher's interests.
The requirements discussed above are by no means exhaustive of
the procedural safeguards which could be invoked to protect the sub-
stantive rights of teachers. There has been judicial reference to
more refined procedural requirements which would further protect
the interests of faculty members. Those suggested safeguards would
require (1) that the ultimate decision of the board rest upon the
charges of which the teacher was notified,"'3 (2) that the ultimate
decision of the board be based on a finding of facts which were
submitted at the hearing,214 and (3) that the hearing be held by an
impartial tribunal.215 Although even the most prescient courts have
not uniformily recognized these broader requirements, the adoption
above, provides: "During the proceeding the faculty member will be permitted to have
an academic advisor and counsel of his own choice." Id. at 450.
212 Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
213 In Gouge v. Joint School District, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970), Judge
Doyle stated that the "necessary corollary" to the requirement of a statement of the
charges against a nontenured teacher is that "the Board's ultimate decision may not rest
on a basis of which the teacher was never notified nor may it rest on a basis to which
the teacher had no opportunity to respond." Id. at 992.
214 "[T]he district court... must judge the constitutionality of [the Board's] action
on the basis of the facts which were before the Board and on its logic." Johnson v.
Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
The district court opinion of the Johnson case, 242 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.C. 1965),
reveals the disadvantage of not having a full record of the initial hearing. As is often
the case, the trial court had to conduct an extended finding of facts de novo to deter-
mine what facts were before the board when it decided not to renew the plaintiff's con-
tract.
2151n Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970), the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit said that teachers with an expectancy of reemployment should be af-
forded a "hearing . . . before a tribunal that both possesses some academic expertise
and has an apparent impartiality toward the charges." Id. at 856.
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of such safeguards may be forthcoming if the courts seek to fully
protect the interests of nontenured teachers.
School authorities might argue that the emerging protections
for nontenured teachers demand that every teacher be afforded the
elaborate and time-consuming procedures formerly required only in
the discharge of tenured teachers. It might thus be urged that the
burden of preparing for, and actually conducting, numerous adver-
sarial hearings, as well as the publicity surrounding such proceed-
ings, would seriously disrupt the school's educational activities. Al-
though it is true that the evolving procedural requirements for non-
tenured teachers do place additional demands upon school author-
ities, there are several factors which should prevent these demands
from seriously interfering with the educational process. Initially, it
must be remembered that the burden of proof and the burden of
going forward at the hearing remain on the nontenured teacher who
challenges his nonretention.2 6 Because these burdens remain with
the teacher, school authorities will not be required to prepare a full
and persuasive case comparable to that required where a tenured
teacher is discharged. Moreover, the undesirable publicity surround-
ing the hearings could be mitigated by the frequent use of in came'a
proceedings. Finally, the procedural requirements discussed above
are not intended to foreclose the opportunity for the nontenured
teacher to knowingly and voluntarily waive his procedural rights
when he is informed of the decision not to reemploy him.217
Regardless of the ultimate refinements of the procedural safe-
guards and the degree of judicial involvement therewith, educational
2 16 In Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972 W.D. Wis.
1970), Judge Doyle stated:
The burden of going forward and the burden of proof rests with the pro-
fessor. Only if he makes a reasonable showing that the stated reasons are
wholly inappropriate as a basis for decision or that they are wholly without
basis in fact would the university administration become obliged to show
that the stated reasons are not inappropriate or that they have a basis in fact.
Id. at 980.
2 1 7 See id. at 980 n.2, where Judge Doyle noted:
I do not intend to foreclose more considerate procedures, which permit the
professor to waive procedural rights, voluntarily and knowingly. For ex-
ample, the initial notice that non-retention is being considered may say that
if the professor makes a written request, within a stated interval, a written
statement of reasons will be supplied him, and that he will be provided with
hearing at which he may respond; otherwise, he will simply be furnished
with a letter announcing the decision without a statement of reasons. Also,
even at the point at which a written statement of reasons is furnished, the
professor may be advised that, if he makes a request for a hearing within a
stated interval, a hearing will be scheduled; otherwise, the procedure will end
with the written notice of non-retention and the reasons therefor.
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institutions at all levels should take it upon themselves to insure
that procedural due process is afforded to all of their teachers. The
confidence that the educational institution's constituents place in a fair
hearing militates that such procedural protection be recognized not
only for the benefit of the teacher, but also for the benefit of the
school itself by insuring that the integrity of its educational system
is being maintained.
V. CONCLUSION
Academic freedom - enveloping the freedoms of study, re-
search, opinion, discussion, expression, publication, speech, teaching,
writing, and communication - is a fundamental element of the infra-
structure of a democratic society which can only be adequately pro-
tected where the proclivity to arbitrary administrative action is ef-
fectively precluded. Thus, the courts, recognizing that "[a]ca-
demic freedom would avail us little if those teachers most likely to
exercise it may be weeded out of the scholastic garden before they
fall within the protective embrace of the tenure statutes,"2' 18 are se-
curing both the tenured and nontenured teachers' substantive and
procedural due process protections. In this process the more enlight-
ened court decisions suggest that too often questions concerning the
particular state's tenure or contract law vis-a-vis the teacher serve
to obfuscate the raison d'etre of the due process clause: "[Dlue
process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best
insurance .. .against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a
system of justice but which are bound to occur on ex parte consid-
erations."219
The court opinions which recognize the pervasive nature of the
due process clause as a protector of both man's dignity22 and the
integrity of a system of justice m2 ' have the force of an idea whose
time has come. The concept of constitutional tenure brings the
copious benefits of academic freedom closer to realization for all
of society.
218 Frakt, Non-tenured Teachers and the Constitution, 18 KAN. L. REV. 27 (1969).
219 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
220 Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 347 (1957).
221 Id. at 346.
